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Framing Algorithms: Competition Law and
(Other) Regulatory Tools
Peter Georg PICHT* & Gaspare Tazio LODERER**
As other fields of law, competition law is put to the test by new technologies in general and
algorithmic market activity in particular. This article takes a holistic approach by looking at areas
of law, namely financial regulation and data protection, which have already put in place rules
and procedures to deal with issues arising from algorithms. Before making the bridge and
assessing whether the application of regulatory tools from these areas might be fruitful for
competition law as well, the article discusses some recent competition cases involving algorithmic
market activity. It concludes with policy recommendations.
1 INTRODUCTION
Although competition law may not be among the first topics one associates with
algorithms1 or Artificial Intelligence (AI),2 it is certainly one area of law that starts to
take a closer look at the phenomenon, and rightfully so. The use of algorithms does not
only present great chances to economy and society, it might also lead to undesirable
results. The algorithms used today can be surprisingly low in their level of sophistica-
tion. However, as they becomemore complex andmove towards an ‘intelligent’ state,
they are likely to disruptively change almost all areas of human life. Even simple
algorithms widely deployed in many different industries today can have a far-reaching
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1 An algorithm can be defined as a precise sequence of instructions to perform a task, see for instance https://
dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/algorithm (accessed 13 June 2019).
2 The term AI was coined by John McCarthy in 1956 and now commonly refers to machines
imitating human intelligence, see for the different definitions on AI Bernard Marr, The Key
Definitions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) That Explain Its Importance, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2018/02/14/the-key-definitions-of-artificial-intelligence-ai-that-explain-its-impor
tance/#3c01e9874f5d (accessed 13 June 2019); machine learning, a subfield of AI, refers to algo-
rithms that learn from data and experience to build intelligent machines; deep learning, a subfield of
machine learning, is based on faster and more accurate learning, although no information on the
decision-making process will be known (OECD, Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the
Digital Age 9–11 (14 Sept. 2017), www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-collusion-competition-
policy-in-the-digital-age.htm) (accessed 13 June 2019).
impact on the forms of and conditions for competitive business conduct in these
markets.3 This fact in itself mandates competition law to scrutinize implications of
algorithmic market conduct and to intervene where they risk distorting competition.
The interaction of algorithms and their collusive potential is (at present) one focal
point of this mandate,4 another example being algorithm-driven resale price
maintenance.5 It seems not clear, though, that competition law has, in its present
shape, the necessary rules and techniques to perform the task. Thus, it may be helpful
to look at other areas of the law, which are more advanced in this respect, and to learn
from their experience.
Against this background, the present article pursues a threefold, ‘toolbox-oriented’
task: Its second section assesses important examples of how other areas of law deal with
algorithm-based market activity.6 The third section sketches three prototypical com-
petitive concerns algorithms may evoke.7 In the article’s last section, we ask whether
competition law’s present toolbox suffices to tackle these concerns, to which extent it
may adopt tools used in other areas of the law, and whether, beyond mere adaptation,
the development of new instruments seems necessary.8
2 THE LEGAL TOOLBOX FOR ALGORITHMS OUTSIDE
COMPETITION LAW – EXAMPLES AND CATEGORIES
2.1 THE ORDERING OF ALGORITHMIC ACTIVITY BY FINANCIAL MARKETS AND DATA
PROTECTION RULES – LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Among the various legal areas which already contain specific provisions on algo-
rithmic activity, this article focusses on financial markets regulation and data
protection law, as their approaches seem particularly apt to inform competition
law on ways to handle algorithmic market activity.
With the implementation of algorithmic trading, financial markets were
among the first to broadly and intensely deploy algorithms as a technical basis for
market activity. Financial markets regulation had thus to react and developed a
comparatively detailed set of rules on algorithmic trading. As to the EU,9 Germany
pioneered with its ‘Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz’10 and the EU followed suit,
3 OECD, supra n. 2, at 11–14.
4 Cf. infra s. 3.2.
5 Cf. infra s. 3.1.
6 Cf. infra s. 2.
7 Cf. infra s. 3.
8 Cf. infra s. 4.
9 Rules in other jurisdictions, such as Switzerland or the United States, are not being examined in this
paper.
10 Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz of 7 May 2013, Bundesgesetzblatt 2013 Teil I Nr. 23, 14 May 2013,
1162–66, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP17/479/47951.html (accessed 13 June 2019).
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issuing the Directive ‘on markets in financial instruments’11 (MiFID II). Based to a
large extent on the European Securities and Market Authority’s (ESMA)12
Guidelines on ‘Systems and Controls in an Automated Trading Environment for
Trading Platforms, Investment Firms and Competent Authorities’,13 the Directive
deals in meticulous detail with several aspects of algorithmic trading (AT)14 and
high-frequency trading (HFT).15
AT, and HFT in particular, can have positive effects on financial markets, for
instance by improving order execution, increasing market liquidity as well as trading
volume, narrowing bid and ask spreads, and reducing short term volatility.16 But
they can also pose specific risks, for example an increased likelihood for duplicate or
erroneous orders, potential ‘automatic’ overreactions to market events, or informa-
tion asymmetries resulting from an inequality of technical (viz. mainly: algorithmic)
equipment.17 To fight these risks, MiFID II uses a combination of measures directed
at firms engaging in algorithmic or high-frequency trading, at those providing
electronic access, and at operators of trading venues.18 In addition to MiFID II,
the market abuse regulation (MAR)19 prohibits some activities relating to algorith-
mic and high-frequency trading by qualifying them as market manipulation.20
Data protection law is another area that already has in place certain elements of
a legal framework for algorithmic (market) activity. This is true for the EU’s
11 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU.
12 https://www.esma.europa.eu (accessed 13 June 2019); see for Technical standards under Directive
2004/39/EC (MiFID I), Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II) and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014
(MiFIR): http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/isd/mifid/its-rts-overview-table_en.pdf
(accessed 13 June 2019).
13 Recital 63 MiFID II; see for the guidelines https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/
2015/11/esma_2012_122_en.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
14 According to MiFID II terminology, AT means the automatic determination of an order by a
computer algorithm with minimal or no human intervention, Art. 4 para. 1 (39) and Recital 59
MiFID II.
15 HFT is considered to be a subset of AT in which ‘a trading system analyses data or signals from the market
at high speed and then sends or updates large numbers of orders within a very short time period in response
to that analysis’ (Recital 61 MiFID II, more precise definition in Art. 4 para. 1 (40) MiFID II). In fall 2018
and spring 2019, the Commission was supposed, according to Art. 90 MiFID II, to report on the impact of
MiFID’s AT/HTF requirements but these reports have been postponed due to ESMA’s request to gain
more time for evaluating MiFID’s ramifications, see https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/
esma-writes-european-commission-mifid-iimifir-review-reports (accessed 13 June 2019).
16 Recital 62 MiFID II; see also Megan Woodward, The Need for Speed: Regulatory Approaches to High
Frequency Trading in the United States and the European Union, 50 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 1359, 1368–69
(2017).
17 Recital 62 MiFID II.
18 Recital 63 MiFID II.
19 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Apr. 2014 on
market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/
72/EC.
20 Art. 12 para. 2 lit. c MAR.
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General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)21 which has replaced an earlier
Directive in May 2018 and established a data protection framework of utmost
relevance to economy and society not only in the EU but also in regions
transacting with EU data subjects.22 Roughly speaking, the GDPR aims to protect
the processing of personal data of natural persons.23 In doing so, it stipulates
general principles and requirements for the processing of data,24 rights and
remedies25 of persons subject to data collection and processing (data subjects),
such as information, access, rectification or erasure,26 and obligations on data
controllers and processors, regarding, for instance, cooperation with supervisory
authorities or the designation of data protection officers.27 As to (cross-border)
enforcement, the Regulation foresees requirements for the transfer of data,28 the
establishment of supervisory authorities,29 and a mechanism for the cooperation
between these authorities.30 Terming the algorithm-based collecting or processing
of data an ‘automated’ one, the GDPR stipulates technological neutrality in the
sense that all rights and obligations safeguarding personal data apply to the manual
and automated handling of data alike.31
As another pertinent piece of EU legislation, the ePrivacy Regulation, prob-
ably to be enacted sometime in 2019, forms a lex specialis to the GDPR.32 It aims at
protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms when using electronic
communication33 and at ensuring the free movement of electronic communication
21 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). On the
Regulation in general, see Tobias Lettl, Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DSGVO), WM 1149 (2018).
22 Cf. Art. 3 GDPR.
23 Art. 1 para. 1 GDPR.
24 Art. 5 et seq. GDPR.
25 Art. 77 et seq. GDPR.
26 Art. 12 et seq. GDPR.
27 Art. 24 et seq. GDPR.
28 Art. 44 et seq. GDPR.
29 Art. 51 et seq. GDPR.
30 Art. 60 et seq. GDPR.
31 Recital 15 GDPR, cf. also Art. 4(2), (4) GDPR.
32 Art. 1 para. 3 of the proposed Regulation concerning the respect for private life and the protection of
personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on
Privacy and Electronic Communications), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/propo
sal-regulation-privacy-and-electronic-communications (accessed 13 June 2019), (ePrivacy
Regulation). The current draft of the Council of the European Union is from 13 Mar. 2019,
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/ePR_3-13-19_draft.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
33 Art. 1 para. 1 ePrivacy Regulation; including machine-to-machine communication, cf. Recital 12 of
the proposed Regulation: ‘Connected devices and machines increasingly communicate with each
other by using electronic communications networks (Internet of Things). The transmission of
machine-to-machine communications involves the conveyance of signals over a network and,
hence, usually constitutes an electronic communications service. In order to ensure full protection
of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications, and to promote a trusted and secure
Internet of Things in the digital single market, it is necessary to clarify that this Regulation should
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data and services.34 To this end, it stipulates a principle of confidentiality of
electronic communications data35 and restricts their storage and processing.36
More specific provisions37 address restrictions of calling and connected line iden-
tification, incoming call blocking, publicly available directories, and unsolicited
communications. Compliance with the general and specific rules is enforced by
remedies closely modelled after those in the GDPR.38 The supervisory authorities
established by the GDPR shall monitor compliance with the ePrivacy Regulation
as well.39
2.2 REGULATORY TOOLS AND CATEGORIES
2.2[a] Transparency and Documentation
It is not the goal of this contribution to separately go into the details of each
financial markets or data protection provision related to algorithms, but to high-
light the main types of tools used by these legal areas. From this point of view, one
can distinguish provisions aiming at transparency of40 and documentation on the
use of algorithms. Investment firms engaging in algorithmic trading, for instance,
are required to notify this to the competent authorities of the trading venue and of
its Member State.41 The latter may require the investment firm to provide
(regularly or ad-hoc) information, in particular on the trading algorithm it
employs, its strategies and limits, as well as compliance and risk control measures.42
At any time, the competent authority of the home Member State of the invest-
ment firm may request further information about the algorithmic trading and the
systems used therefore.43 Hence, such information has to be documented44 and
might also be forwarded to the competent authorities of a trading venue at which
the investment firm undertakes algorithmic trading.45 Moreover, an investment
apply also to the machine-to-machine communications whenever these are related to users. Therefore,
the principle of confidentiality enshrined in this Regulation should also apply to the transmission of
machine-to-machine communications. Specific safeguards could also be adopted under sectorial
legislation, as for instance Directive 2014/53/EU.’
34 Art. 1 para. 2 ePrivacy Regulation.
35 Art. 5 ePrivacy Regulation.
36 Art. 6 et seq. ePrivacy Regulation.
37 Art. 12 et seq. ePrivacy Regulation.
38 Art. 21 et seq. ePrivacy Regulation.
39 Art. 18 et seq. ePrivacy Regulation.
40 Transparency meaning not only perceptibility but also comprehensibility.
41 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 1 MiFID II.
42 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 2 MiFID II.
43 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 2 MiFID II.
44 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 4 MiFID II.
45 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 3 MiFID II.
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firm engaging in HFT46 must keep accurate and time-sequenced records of all
orders and make them available to the competent authority upon request.47
Further transparency measures include the duty to flag orders generated by algo-
rithmic trading, the different algorithms used for the creation of orders, and the
relevant persons initiating those orders.48
Turning to examples for transparency in data protection law, Article 17 of the
draft ePrivacy Regulation requires the providers of electronic communications ser-
vices to inform end users about security risks49 and Article 13 paragraph 2 litera f50
GDPR stipulates that the use of automated decision making based on Article 22
GDPR51 shall be communicated to the data subject, including information about the
involved logic and the consequences of the data processing. In this respect, it is
disputed whether Article 13 GDPR constitutes a duty to disclose the algorithm itself,
with the leading opinion answering this question in the negative because this would
result in a forced disclosure of trade secrets.52 Another prominent provision of the
GDPR also aims at transparency and documentation: According to Article 20 GDPR
and its corresponding Guidelines53 and Recitals, the ‘data subject shall have the right
to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a
controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have
the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the
controller to which the personal data have been provided’. This ‘data portability right’
46 If they only engage in AT, they must also keep their transaction data due to the general provisions of
Art. 25 MiFIR (Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012) and Art.
16 para. 6 MiFID II.
47 Art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 5 MiFID II.
48 Art. 48 para. 10 MiFID II.
49 ‘Where the risk lies outside the scope of the measures to be taken by the service provider’, the latter
has to ‘inform end-users of any possible remedies, including an indication of the likely costs involved’
(Art. 17 ePrivacy Regulation).
50 Cf. also Art. 14 para. 2 lit. g and Art. 15 para. 1 lit. h GDPR.
51 Cf. infra s. 2.2.2.
52 Boris P. Paal & Moritz Hennemann, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Art. 13
para. 31 (Boris P. Paal & Daniel A. Pauly, 2nd ed., C. H.Beck 2018); Holger Greve, Europäische
Datenschutzgrundverordnung, Art. 12 para. 7 (Gernot Sydow, 2nd ed., Nomos 2018); Marcus Helfrich,
ibid., Art. 22 para. 79 (regarding Art. 15 para. 1 lit. h GDPR); Matthias Bäcker, Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Art. 13 para. 54 (Jürgen Kühling & Benedikt Buchner, 2nd
ed., C. H.Beck 2018); Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7
IDPL 76, 89–90 (2017).
53 The so-called ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’, a body composed of representatives of the
Member States’ data protection authorities, of the European Data Protection Supervisor, and of the
European Commission, issued Guidelines on Art. 20 GDPR, see Art. 29 Data Protection Working
Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability, 5 Apr. 2017, 16/EN WP 242 rev.01, http://ec.europa.
eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=611233 (accessed 13 June 2019).
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is rich in implications54 and it conveys a far-reaching right to control and duplicate
the use of the pertinent personal data.55 At the same time, it is a means to increase
transparency on which data has been collected regarding a specific data subject and to
communicate this information to the person most concerned, namely to the data
subject.
Transparency for data subjects, together with the control that the subjects can
exercise due to this transparency, are also important elements of privacy by design and
by default, one of the key elements of the GDPR. Implementing this concept, Article
25 GDPR requires data processors to implement, already in the design-phase, appro-
priate technical and organizational measures for the protection of data subjects’ rights.
Besides transparency and control, this encompasses the processing, by default, only of
data necessary for the respective purpose, as well as pseudonymization and general
restraint in the collection of data. Appropriate certification may be used to demonstrate
compliance with these requirements (Article 25 paragraph 3 GDPR). In practice, a set
of actionable guidelines in combination with documentation can form the basis for
demonstrating data protection by design and default.56
2.2[b] Prevention and Deterrence
Prevention and deterrence of adverse effects generated by algorithmic market
activity form the focus of another set of rules. Article 22 paragraph 1 GDPR57
protects the data subject from decisions solely based on automated processing,58
54 Among them are the questions of how to define ‘personal data … provided to a controller’, the only
type of data subject to the portability right; of how a data subject may use its portability right as a basis
for transacting over its data, e.g. by assigning to third parties a claim to access the data; of whether the
data subject must wait until the controller has collected and assembled the data or whether Art. 20
GDPR implies a right to directly collect data regardless of the collector’s business secrets being affected
by such an act; of whether portability creates an ownership-like control over ported data; or of how to
balance, mainly in the application of Art. 20 para. 4 GDPR, the portability right with intellectual
property rights extending to the respective data. See on these aspects, Colette Cuijpers, Nadezhda
Purtova & Eleni Kosta, Data Protection Reform and the Internet: The Draft Data Protection Regulation 558
(Andrej Savin & Jan Trzaskowski, Research Handbook on EU Internet Law, Edward Elgar 2014);
Inge Graef, Martin Husovec & Nadezhda Purtova, Data Portability and Data Control, Lessons for an
Emerging Concept in EU Law, 22 Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series 1, 9–13
(2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071875 (accessed 13 June 2019); Hans-Georg Kamann & Martin
Braun, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Art. 20, paras 33–37 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr, 2nd ed.,
C. H.Beck 2018); Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra n. 53, at 12.
55 Graef, Husovec & Purtova, supra n. 54, at 5, 7, 19.
56 https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regula
tion-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-by-design-and-default (accessed 13 June 2019).
57 The preceding Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct. 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data already contained a similar provision in Art. 15.
58 Automated processing encompasses algorithms (Mario Martini, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung,
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Art. 22 para. 21 (Boris P. Paal & Daniel A. Pauly, 2nd ed., C. H.Beck 2018)).
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including profiling,59 if these decisions have significant (legal) effects. As an addi-
tion to Article 22, Recital 71 paragraph 2 formulates some requirements for
profiling algorithms, such as the use of appropriate mathematical or statistical
procedures and the prevention of discrimination based on sensitive data (e.g.
ethnicity). A decision based solely on automated processing is, as an exception,
permissible, if it serves the entering or performance of a contract60 or if the data
subject has given its explicit consent.61 In such cases, the ‘data controller’ has a
duty to implement suitable procedures, with a minimum standard of protection
consisting of a right of the data subject to obtain human intervention, to express his
or her point of view as well as to contest the decision.62 The definition of ‘suitable
measures’ does, however, not seem to go as far as to require the algorithm to be
disclosed.63 While Article 22 GDPR tries to mitigate the risks associated with
automated decision-making based on algorithms,64 the provision’s implications are
limited65 by its focus on automation without human interference. Nonetheless, it
is at least an attempt at the ex ante protection of data subjects from uncontrolled
algorithmic decision-making.66
Article 35 GDPR67 seeks risk prevention by way of ex ante impact assessment for
processing with a high risk for a natural person’s rights and freedoms.68 Regarding
algorithmic data processing, the GDPR perceives such a risk where an extensive and
systematic evaluation results from automated decision making including profiling.69
Ex ante-testing and impact assessment is a mechanism extensively employed
by financial markets regulation as well. Regulatory Technical Standards 6 (RTS 6)
set out important parts of the organizational requirements for the testing and
monitoring exercises to be carried out by investment firms engaged in algorithmic
trading.70 The testing requirements include testing prior to deployment or update
59 Profiling is characterized in Art. 4(4) GDPR as using personal data to evaluate a natural person’s
specific personal aspects.
60 Art. 22 para. 2 lit. a GDPR.
61 Art. 22 para. 2 lit. b GDPR.
62 Art. 22 para. 3 GDPR.
63 Martini, supra n. 58, at Art. 22 para. 36; Benedikt Buchner, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung,
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Art. 22 para. 35 (Jürgen Kühling & Benedikt Buchner, 2nd ed., C. H.Beck
2018); Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, supra n. 52, at 94.
64 Martini, supra n. 58, at Art. 22, para. 8.
65 Ulrich Dammann, Erfolge und Defizite der EU-Datenschutzgrundverordnung, Erwarteter Fortschritt,
Schwächen und überraschende Innovationen, ZD 307, 312–13 (2016).
66 OECD, supra n. 2, at 49; Martini, supra n. 58, Art. 22 para. 46.
67 On the applicability of this provision to algorithms, see Martini, supra n. 58, Art. 35 paras 18 & 77.
68 Art. 35 para. 1 GDPR.
69 Art. 35 para. 3 lit. a GDPR.
70 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/589 of 19 July 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/
65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards
specifying the organizational requirements of investment firms engaged in algorithmic trading, https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0589&from=EN (accessed 13
June 2019).
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of the algorithms,71 as well as a testing approach that secures the algorithm’s
conformance with the system of the trading venue or of the direct market access
provider.72 Some of the tests have to be undertaken in a sandbox-like testing
environment.73 An annual self-assessment and validation requirement74 includes a
stress testing of the algorithmic trading system.75
Similar to those for investment firms, Regulatory Technical Standards 7 (RTS
7) set out rules for trading venues.76 They have to test their trading systems,77
require their members and participants to test their algorithms, and provide an
environment that allows for such testing.78 These tests include a requirement for
the members to conduct conformance testing in the testing environment of the
trading venue,79 so as to avoid disorderly trading conditions.80 Overall, trading
venues need to ensure that algorithmic trading does not lead to disorderly market
conditions and to manage such conditions in case they arise nevertheless.81
More general rules stipulate that an investment firm engaging in AT or HFT82
shall, in particular,83 have in place84 resilient trading systems with sufficient capacity,
continuity agreements for trading system failures, and measures to avoid creating or
contributing to a disorderly market (e.g. prevention of erroneous orders) as well as a
use of trading systems contrary to the MAR or the rules of connected trading venues.
Trading venues85 shall, in general, establish resilient and tested trading systems and
ensure their ability to deal with large order volumes and markets under stress.86 A
71 Art. 5 RTS 6.
72 Art. 6 RTS 6.
73 Art. 7 RTS 6: ‘an environment that is separated from its production environment and that is used
specifically for the testing and development of algorithmic trading systems and trading algorithms’. For
sandboxing in financial markets see also the regulatory sandbox of the Financial Conduct Authority in the
UK, https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf and https://www.fca.org.uk/
publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-lessons-learned-report.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
74 Art. 9 RTS 6.
75 Art. 10 RTS 6.
76 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/584 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/
65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards
specifying organizational requirements of trading venues, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017R0584&from=EN (accessed 13 June 2019).
77 Art. 8 RTS 7.
78 Art. 48 para. 6 MiFID II.
79 Art. 9 RTS 7.
80 Art. 10 RTS 7.
81 Art. 48 para. 6 MiFID II.
82 Since HFT is a subset of AT, specific rules on AT also apply to investment firms engaging in HFT
(Danny Busch, MiFID II: Regulating High Frequency Trading, Other Forms of Algorithmic Trading and
Direct Electronic Market Access, 10 LFMR 72, 75 in fine (2016)).
83 Besides, i.a., requiring authorization (Art. 5 MiFID II).
84 Art. 17 para. 1 MiFID II.
85 Consisting of regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and organized trading facilities
(OTFs), cf. Art. 4 para. 1(24) MiFID II.
86 Art. 48 para. 1 MiFID II for regulated markets, in conjunction with Art. 18 para. 5 MiFID II for
MTFs and OTFs.
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deterring, or at least a steering rationale is particularly conspicuous in provisions on
increased fees for unwanted practices87 and on the allocation of responsibilities.88
2.2[c] Ex post Intervention
Where prevention has failed, ex post intervention can become necessary. To detect
and satisfy the need for such intervention, financial markets rules require constant
monitoring89 of algorithmic transactions, ‘kill functionalities’ permitting the can-
cellation of such transactions as an emergency measure,90 and the implementation
of business continuity agreements91 preventing the break-down of business in case
of disruptive events.
As a stakeholder-driven combination of prevention and ex post intervention,
the GDPR provides for ‘binding corporate rules’ specifying, inter alia, the reme-
dies available to data subjects in case of a violation of GDPR rules. If approved by
the competent supervisory authority, such binding corporate rules – a novelty in
EU data protection law – can legitimize the cross-border transfer of data, in
particular between the companies of a group.92 Regarding, in particular, the rights
of data subjects related to an automated decision-making, the competent super-
visory authority shall approve binding corporate rules addressing the data subject’s
right to file a complaint and to seek remedies such as redress and compensation.93
In the same vein, Articles 21–24 of the draft ePrivacy Regulation provide for
compensation, administrative fines and – subject to Member State law – other
penalties.
3 PROMINENT ALGORITHMIC ISSUES IN THE FIELD OF
COMPETITION LAW
We cannot, today, foresee all the facets of AI and algorithmic market activity which
may come under competition law scrutiny and this article cannot even attempt to
87 Art. 48 para. 9 subpara. 3 MiFID II.
88 Art. 5 para. 3 RTS 6; cf. also Art. 1 and Recital 3 RTS 6: ‘As a part of its overall governance
framework and decision making framework, an investment firm should have a clear and formalized
governance arrangement, including clear lines of accountability, effective procedures for the commu-
nication of information and a separation of tasks and responsibilities’.
89 Arts 9, 10, 13, 16 RTS 6. Trading venues to which AT and HFT traders are connected have to meet
specific requirements laid down, in particular, in Arts 7, 12, 14 RTS 7; Busch, supra n. 82, at 78; cf.
also the decision Autocomplete, Az. VI ZR 269/12 (BGH 14 May 2013), on a potential duty to monitor
the autocomplete feature of internet search algorithms.
90 Art. 12 RTS 6; Art. 18 para. 2 lit. c RTS 7.
91 Art. 14 RTS 6.
92 Thomas Zerdick, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Art. 47 paras 2–3 (Eugen Ehmann & Martin Selmayr,
2nd ed., C. H.Beck 2018).
93 Art. 47 para. 1 para. 2 lit. e GDPR.
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detail the gamut of constellations whose relevance we already perceive. We there-
fore limit this section to three types of cases that are both much discussed at present
and potentially prototypical for the intersection of algorithms and competition law.
3.1 ALGORITHMIC RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
In four recent decisions, the EU Commission dealt, for the first time since the
Yamaha decision in 2003,94 with resale price maintenance (RPM). This time,
however, the RPM was algorithm-driven95 and twofold: On the one hand, the
four consumer electronics manufacturers Asus, Denon & Marantz, Philips and
Pioneer (‘Asus and others’) used algorithms to monitor the resale prices of online
retailers. In cases of price decreases,96 they imposed sanctions or threatened to do
so.97 On the other hand, the retailers were using pricing algorithms themselves.
Thus, pricing restrictions imposed by Asus and others had an effect on the online
prices in general.98 However, pricing algorithms can also benefit customers. The
Pioneer decision, for instance, reveals that employees tried to identify ‘who is the
aggressor and who is the follower’ in price adjustments.99 A diagram in the Philips
decision demonstrates that the price decreases by a ‘maverick’ were followed (in
particular) by another competitor.100 In spite of this evidence, both scholars and
the EU Commission underline that unilateral price adjustments in algorithmic
markets are not necessarily matched by (all) other players, for instance because
algorithmic reactions to changes in price can heavily depend on the programming
of the respective digital tools.101
94 Commission Decision of 16 July 2003, Case COMP/37.975 PO/Yamaha.
95 Similarly, Pat Treacy, Stephen Smith & Edwin Bond, Maintaining Price Competition Between Retailers in
E-Commerce Markets: The European Commission’s Recent RPM Decisions, 39 ECLR 470, 471 (2018),
note that the novelty of the decisions lies in the control of resale pricing restrictions through software.
96 Cf. on possible incentives for higher resale prices: Clemens Graf York von Wartenburg, Craig G. Falls
& Michael I. Okkonen, Recent EU Fines for Resale Price Maintenance are Symptoms of Broader Challenges
Faced by Today’s Consumer-Goods Manufacturers, 39 ECLR 495, 496 (2018).
97 EU Commission, Press Release of 24 July 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4601_
en.htm (accessed 13 June 2019).
98 Ibid.; Asus, Case AT.40465, decision of 24 July 2018, para. 58, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
cases/dec_docs/40465/40465_337_3.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019); Denon & Marantz, Case AT.40469,
decision of 24 July 2018, para. 95 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40469/
40469_329_3.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019); Philips, Case AT.40181, decision of 24 July 2018, paras 46–47
(with diagram), 64, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40181/40181_417_3.pdf
(accessed 13 June 2019); Pioneer, Case AT.40182, decision of 24 July 2018, paras 134–39, http://ec.
europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40182/40182_370_3.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
99 Pioneer, supra n. 98, para. 139.
100 Philips, supra n. 98, para. 47.
101 Treacy, Smith & Bond, supra n. 95, at 472; Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition
Committee, Algorithms and Collusion – Note from the European Union, 14 June 2017, paras 9 & 16, https://
one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)12/en/pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
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Whether sustained by direct (agreement) or indirect means (e.g. threats, penalties,
contract termination), RPM is prohibited as a ‘restriction by object’ under Article 101
paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and as a
‘hardcore restriction’ under Article 4 litera a of the Vertical Block Exemption
Regulation (VBER).102 The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints underline that RPM
can be more effective when combined with price monitoring systems103 and the
Commission acknowledges in its Algorithm Report that algorithmic price monitoring
systems can form part of RPM infringements as they contribute to their effectiveness.104
It is in line with these statements that, in the cases at hand, the conduct of
assisting RPM by way of monitoring software was not exempted under the VBER
or under Article 101 paragraph 3 TFEU.105 Hence, companies need to be careful
that their use of pricing algorithms and monitoring software is not ‘infected’, and
turned into a competition law violation, by the parallel implementation of an anti-
competitive practice such as RPM.106 At the same time, though, the fact that the
retailers themselves were not fined confirms that the use of algorithms for pricing
or price level observation is not unlawful as such.107
As the companies were cooperative, the cases at issue required neither examination
of the employed algorithms nor in-depth technical expertise. Nonetheless, they may
foreshadow an era of EU ‘algorithmic antitrust’, in which algorithms will be closely
scrutinized by competition authorities.108 Additionally, the considerable reduction in
the fines the companies had to pay,109 while not in itself a novel feature of EU
competition law,110 may be the starting point for a process of working out, through
pertinent case law, what effective cooperation between undertakings and competition
agencies may look like with regard to algorithmic systems.
102 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 Apr. 2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices.
103 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 19 May 2010, para. 48; Philips, supra n. 98, para. 64; Pioneer, supra n.
98, para. 155.
104 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, supra n. 101, para. 14.
105 Asus, supra n. 98, paras 115–17; Denon & Marantz, supra n. 98, paras 101–03; Philips, supra n. 98, paras
71–73; Pioneer, supra n. 98, paras 163–65.
106 York von Wartenburg, Falls & Okkonen, supra n. 96, at 497–98.
107 Cf. also Niccolò Colombo, What the European Commission (Still) Does Not Tell Us About Pricing
Algorithms in the Aftermath of the E-Comerce Sector Inquiry, 39 ECLR 478, 480 (2018).
108 Aurélien Portuese, European Algorithmic Antitrust and Resale Price Maintenance: Asus, Denon & Marantz,
Philips, and Pioneer Decisions, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/european-algorith
mic-antitrust-and-resale-price-maintenance-asus-denon-marantz-philips-and-pioneer-decisions
(accessed 13 June 2019).
109 The cooperation resulted in reductions to the fines of 50% for Pioneer and 40% for Asus, Denon &
Marantz and Philips, EU Commission, Press Release of 24 July 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-4601_en.htm (accessed 13 June 2019).
110 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Art. 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003,
para. 29.
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3.2 ALGORITHMIC COLLUSION111
The competitive process risks suffering harm when competitors make arrangements
regarding their market activity. Such arrangements are usually called ‘collusion’ if they
serve to raise the coordinating parties’ profits above the non-cooperative equilibrium.112
‘Explicit collusion’ rests on an agreement or some other form of concertation between
the involved market players, while ‘tacit collusion’,113 oftentimes leading to parallel
behaviour, requires no such concertation and can, in particular, result from market
players monitoring and reacting to each other’s independent business decisions.114 Both
types of collusion are economically undesirable as they tend to result in supra-compe-
titive prices, lower output, deadweight losses, and, ultimately, a reduction in (consumer)
welfare.115 Nonetheless, most competition law regimes presently prohibit only explicit
collusion while tolerating tacit collusion and parallel behaviour, not least because
banning tacit collusion might inhibit market players from intelligently adapting their
business strategy to their competitors’ prices or other market conditions – after all a key
component of competitive behaviour.116
Algorithms can, in various ways, be tools for establishing explicit
collusion.117 The use of identical pricing algorithms by competitors, for
instance, is, arguably, not unlawful as such118 but it can help competitors to
unlawfully align their prices as part of a joint and consented strategy reducing
competitive pressure.119 Instead of such a decentralized strategy, competitors
111 This section is based to a large extend on Peter Georg Picht & Benedikt Freund, Competition (Law) in
the Era of Algorithms, 39 ECLR 403 (2018).
112 OECD, supra n. 2, at 19; cf. also Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics – A Modern Approach, 531–
32 (9th ed., W. W. Norton & Company 2014).
113 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 52–53 (2nd ed., University of Chicago Press 2001).
114 Picht & Freund, supra n. 111, at 404; Michael K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelism and Price-Fixing: Defining
the Boundary, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 508, 517–26 (1985).
115 OECD, supra n. 2, at 19–20; Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law, Text, Cases and
Materials 650 (6th ed., Oxford University Press 2016).
116 For the EU:AhlströmOsakeyhtiö andOthers v. Commission, C-89/85, para. 71 (ECJ 31Mar. 1993); Suiker Unie
and Others v. Commission, C-40/73, para. 174 (ECJ 16 Dec. 1975); cf. also Jones & Sufrin, supra. n. 115, at
694–98; for the US: In re: Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, No. 14–2301, 10–11 (7th Cir. 9 Apr. 2015).
117 Cf. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit
Competition, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1775, 1784–87 (2017).
118 See Advocate General Szpunar’s remark in a footnote in the Uber case: ‘the use by competitors of the same
algorithm to calculate the price is not in itself unlawful, but might give rise to hub-and-spoke conspiracy
concerns when the power of the platform increases’ (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, 11 May 2017,
Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C-434/15, fn. 23); Michal Gal sees possible unlawful conduct where
competitors (1) start to consciously use similar algorithms, despite better algorithms being available, (2) feed
the same or similar training data to the learning algorithm, despite better training data being available and
despite the awareness of the possibility of similar pricing results, or (3) make the algorithm transparent to
competitors without any procompetitive justification (Competition Lore Podcast by Caron Beaton-
Wells, Competition and Algorithms – Friend or Foe?, Episode of 19 Sept. 2018, 55”13’, https://overcast.
fm/+N2zZD5F3Q/55:13) (accessed 13 June 2019).
119 United States v. David Topkins, Plea Agreement, No. CR 15 201 WHO (n. D. Cal. 30 Apr. 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/628891/download (accessed 13 June 2019); United States v.
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may jointly implement120 a ‘hub and spoke’ cartel, for instance121 by delegating
the setting of prices (and potentially other conditions) to a central, algorithmic
agent.122 The coordination necessary to establish the hub and spoke structure
typically requires some form of explicit collusion. Another option, the ‘signal-
ling’ strategy, employs algorithms to exchange concealed information about
(planned) market behaviour by sending, for example, pricing data which is
being registered and possibly agreed upon.123
Whatever the strategy, explicit collusion remains illegal, regardless of
whether it is being implemented by traditional, analogue techniques or by
cutting-edge algorithms.124 The challenges algorithmic explicit collusion pre-
sents consist, hence, not in deciding whether such conduct should be banned
but rather in assessing its likelihood, detecting it in specific cases, and assign-
ing appropriate liability.125 Compared to more old-fashioned scenarios, sev-
eral factors can complicate the uncovering of algorithmic collusion. For
instance, algorithms can run their direct interaction at much higher speed
than humans,126 and they can cloak it in patterns more complex than those of
human communication.127
David Topkins, No. CR 15 201 WHO (n. D. Cal. 6 Apr. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-
document/file/513586/download (accessed 13 June 2019); according to the Commission’s report on the
E-commerce sector inquiry 67% of the 53% of respondents tracking competitor’s prices do so by
automated systems and 78% of those 67% adjust their prices (European Commission, Preliminary Report
on the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry, 15 Sept. 2016, SWD(2016) 312, 56, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/sector_inquiry_preliminary_report_en.pdf) (accessed 13 June 2019).
120 Hub and spoke settings are more likely to occur as the result of explicit collusion, although they may
also result from implicit collusion.
121 For further variants and details, see Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 117, at 1787–88.
122 Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796, Opinion and Order (S.D.N.Y. 31 Mar. 2016); Eturas and Others,
C-74/14 (ECJ 21 Jan. 2016); see also Andreas Heinemann & Aleksandra Gebicka, Can Computers Form
Cartels? About the Need for European Institutions to Revise the Concertation Doctrine in the Information Age, 7
JECLAP 431 (2016).
123 OECD, supra n. 2, at 29–31.
124 Monopolkommission, XXII. Hauptgutachten: Wettbewerb 2018, para. 201, https://www.monopolkom
mission.de/images/HG22/HGXXII_Gesamt.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019); cf. also EU Commission in
its submission to the OECD: ‘if pricing practices are illegal when implemented offline, there is a strong
chance that they will be illegal as well when implemented online’ (Directorate for Financial and
Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, supra n. 101, para. 38).
125 Cf. Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 215, according to which algorithms represent the prior
will of the user but a shift in liability may have to be considered regarding self-learning algorithms.
126 OECD, supra n. 2, at 22 with reference to the Autorité de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt,
Competition Law and Data 14–15, https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/
Berichte/Big%20Data%20Papier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 (accessed 13 June 2019). Humans
can be involved in algorithmic collusion as well, of course, but more indirectly, as coders, imple-
menters, beneficiaries, etc., not as those directly exercising the coordination.
127 Algorithms may be much better in devising and deciphering math patterns, but they may be much
weaker in decoding the non-verbal and non-mathematical communication (a look, a wink of the
eyes, a handshake, an ambiguous expression) with which humans are able to convey complex,
multi-facetted messages.
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Where competition law enforcers manage, nonetheless, to discover algorith-
mic collusion that violates the law, they must decide on the liability of and on
sanctions for the humans having built, coded, implemented or profited from the
colluding algorithm. The degree of complexity and independence with which the
algorithm operates ought probably to matter in this respect. This is because
humans, as the ultimate addressees of liability, exercise much more direct control
over ‘simple’ algorithms that merely execute patterns initially coded into them128
than over so-called ‘deep learning’ algorithms129 which are able to make decisions
based on their own artificial neural network. Currently, creators of such (deep
learning) algorithms are only liable as ‘assistants’ if they knew about the possible
collusive employment and condoned it.130 The may escape liability if the algo-
rithms produce a collusive outcome that the creators, but not the involved
companies, knew about (possibly due to the algorithm’s complexity).131 In any
case, their algorithms cannot be qualified as undertakings under the Höfner criteria
(regardless of their degree of autonomy) and, consequently, cannot infringe on
Article 101 TFEU.132 Arguably, they are rather agents operating for someone
else.133 Given that these reflections indicate a certain risk of liability loopholes,
some contributions seem to favour liability for the creators of algorithms to be
based more strongly on collusive outcomes.134
Tacit collusion requires a more fundamental reflection: Besides other
reasons, competition law has – so far and except for cases of joint market
dominance – tolerated135 the detrimental economic effects of tacit collusion
because conventional wisdom has it that this type of conduct requires rather
specific conditions to succeed. In a nutshell, these conditions are (1) an
oligopolistic market structure,136 (2) homogeneity of goods and services in
the market,137 (3) market transparency,138 and (4) high barriers for market
128 Cf. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 117, at 1787.
129 Cf. OECD, supra n. 2, at 32.
130 Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 265.
131 Ibid., paras 266–68.
132 Höfner and Elser v. Macroton GmbH, C-41/90, para. 21 (ECJ 23 Apr. 1991).
133 Nicolas Petit, Antitrust and Artificial Intelligence: A Research Agenda, 8 JECLAP 361, 362 (2017).
134 Cf. Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 271.
135 Joint market dominance only partially covers tacit collusion, cf. Monopolkommission, supra n. 124,
paras 217–24.
136 Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, Oligopoly Experiments in the Current Millennium, 27 J. Econ. Surv. 439, 448
(2013).
137 Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright & Jean Tirole, The Economics of Tacit Collusion,
Final Report for DG Competition 47, 66 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_
reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
138 See Christian Schultz, Transparency on the Consumer Side and Tacit Collusion, 49 Eur. Econ. Rev. 279-82
(2003).
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entry.139 Since these conditions appear(ed) to be present in a few markets only,
the economic harm from tacit collusion seemed limited as well.140
The use of algorithms may, however, change this assessment in several ways:
Regarding market structure (condition 1 above), algorithms may facilitate collusion in
less concentratedmarkets because they can rapidly analyse large amounts of data and, as
a consequence, it is easier to coordinate the behaviour of several market players.141
Moreover, if algorithms learn, by means of AI and past data, to detect changes in
demand and ensuing price reductions, the importance of demand fluctuations as a
traditional instability factor in oligopoly settings might be mitigated.142 Other factors
destabilizing collusion, such as human biases and errors, may be eliminated as well.143
As to homogeneity (condition 2 above), algorithms facilitate personalized pricing and
product offerings,144 reducing the homogeneity of goods and services in a market, but
also increasing the price points that need to be coordinated.145 More generally,
complex, differing algorithms may enable competitors to display a more heterogeneous
set ofmarket strategies than if their human representatives had to come upwith creative
strategies themselves, and this strategic variance may reduce the likelihood for
collusion.146 Regarding transparency (condition 3 above), algorithms tend to increase
market transparency due to their ability to rapidly collect data frommultiple sources.147
This helps to detect deliberate deviations from a collusive equilibrium and to separate
them from simple market adaptations, such as changes in demand.148 As to entry
barriers (condition 4 above), a market strategy that combines algorithms and (data
generated on) digital platforms potentially heightens entry barriers related to platform-
typical network effects, economies of scale, and big data-mining possibilities.149
139 OECD, supra n. 2, at 20–21; Michal S. Gal, Algorithmic-Facilitated Coordination: Market and Legal
Solutions, 2 Antitrust Chronicle 22 (2017), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-con
tent/uploads/2017/05/AC_May.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
140 Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 Minn. L. Rev.
1323, 1328 (2016); Rolf H. Weber, Disruptive Technologies and Competition Law, Ch. 4.2.1 (Klaus
Mathis & Tor Avishalom, New Developments in Competition Law and Economics, Springer 2019);
see also Autorité de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, supra n. 126, at 14–15.
141 Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 182; OECD, supra n. 2, at 21.
142 Francisco Beneke &Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt,Artificial Intelligence and Collusion, 50 IIC 109, 126–27 (2019).
143 Cf. in detail Picht & Freund, supra n. 111, at 405.
144 Cf. also Ulrich Schwalbe, Algorithms, Machine Learning, and Collusion 4, https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3232631 (accessed 13 June 2019).
145 Petit, supra n. 133, at 361.
146 Ibid.
147 Competition and Markets Authority, Pricing Algorithms, Economic Working Paper on the use of Algorithms
to Facilitate Collusion and Personalised Pricing, 8 Oct. 2018, paras 5.26 and 8.3(b), https://assets.publish
ing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/746353/Algorithms_
econ_report.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019); Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 181; OECD, supra
n. 2, at 21–22.
148 Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 181.
149 Schwalbe, supra n. 144, at 4, however, noting that algorithmic pricing as a service is provided by firms
such as Feedvisor, PricingPro or Intelligence Node and might reduce market entry barriers.
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Algorithm-based personalization strategies can create entry barriers as well if they
strongly attach customers to the personalizing incumbent.150 On the other hand,
availability of data resulting from widespread use of algorithms may reduce entry
costs for new market players.151
As these reflections show, the influence of algorithms on the traditional
conditions for tacit coordination does not appear fully settled yet.152 In spite of
ambiguities, however, it may be argued that algorithms are a catalyst for the
establishment of collusion in markets already prone to such coordination.153 If,
in addition, (deep learning) algorithms were to make tacit collusion less dependent
on its traditional preconditions154 and, overall, more likely, competition law’s
present approach towards tacit collusion may have to be reassessed. Factors to
potentially consider in this exercise are the extent to which competitors are using
identical algorithms, as this can indicate the reach of hub and spoke cartels, and the
source of the data sets on which these algorithms were based and trained, as using
data from several competitors may increase the risk for tacit collusion.155
In fact, a recent article156 seems to confirm that algorithmic markets put the
traditional conditions for tacit collusion to their test. In a controlled, market-
simulating environment, relatively simple algorithms learned to collude by trial
and error, with their initial instruction stating only that the algorithms maximize
profits, but not specifying how to do so.157 The algorithms came to their collusive
results with no prior knowledge of the environment in which they operated, with-
out communicating with one another, and without being specifically designed or
instructed to collude.158 Notably, collusion prevailed even in simulations with up to
four algorithms159 and inhomogeneity in cost and demand had only a limited effect
or, respectively, did not prevent collusion entirely.160
150 Competition and Markets Authority, supra n. 147, para. 8.4(b); cf. also Monopolkommission, supra n.
124, para. 183.
151 OECD, supra n. 2, at 21.
152 Schwalbe, supra n. 144, at 4; Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 197; OECD, supra n. 2, at 23-24.
153 Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 197; Ashwin Ittoo & Nicolas Petit, Algorithmic Pricing Agents
and Tacit Collusion: A Technological Perspective 2–3, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046405 (accessed 13
June 2019).
154 Michal Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 67, 116 (2019); OECD, supra n. 2,
at 24.
155 Competition and Markets Authority, supra n. 147, paras 8.7(b) and (c).
156 Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio Pastorello, Artificial Intelligence,
Algorithmic Pricing and Collusion 3, https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?
dpno=13405 (accessed 13 June 2019).
157 https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/02/artificial-intelligence-algorithmic-pri
cing-and-collusion (accessed 13 June 2019).
158 Calvano, Calzolari, Denicolò & Pastorello, supra n. 156, at 3, 39.
159 Ibid., at 31–32.
160 Ibid., at 32–33, 35.
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3.3 GOOGLE Shopping: Paving the way for a ‘results-based algorithmic
approach’?
Cases relating to the use of algorithms by dominant market players are slowly moving
into the antitrust spotlight. Twoprominent examples are theGermanBundeskartellamt’s
Lufthansa case161 and the EUCommission’s Google Shopping case. In the context of this
article, the Google Shopping case is of particular interest because the EU Commission’s
approach focused on the market results of Google’s conduct rather than on the (in)
appropriateness of the algorithmic design which brought them about.162
In this prong of Google’s confrontation with competition agencies,163 the EU
Commission had to assess whether Google was abusing its dominance164 on the
search engine market and held the company did so by demoting rival comparison
shopping services in its search results whilst prominently placing its own (‘Google
Shopping’).165 The demotion was attributed to several criteria in Google’s search
algorithm and the fact that Google Shopping itself was not subject to the workings
of the algorithm, resulting in significant gain in traffic for Google Shopping and
corresponding losses for its competitors.166 The decision raises several interesting
161 In the context of the insolvency of Air Berlin, the German Bundeskartellamt started a preliminary investiga-
tion to assess the initiation of proceedings against Lufthansa due to abusive pricing. After Air Berlin’s
insolvency, Lufthansa’s algorithmically determined ticket fares skyrocketed (+ 25–30%) on certain – now
monopolistic – routes. In the end, the Bundeskartellamt did not initiate proceedings because of competitor
easyJet’s quick entry into the market which resulted in a market structure comparable to the one before Air
Berlin’s insolvency. Nonetheless, the case brings up the important question as to what extent the insolvency
of a competitor or similar changes in market structure have to be considered in the price determination
parameters of an algorithm and whether there is a duty to monitor and adjust (potentially after a grace period)
the algorithm in the event of such structural changes. This issue gains in significance if insolvency leads to a
dominant position of the remaining market participant, subjecting the latter to the stricter requirements for
dominant companies. Cf. Bundeskartellamt, Press Release of 29 May 2018 (https://www.bundeskartellamt.
de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/29_05_2018_Lufthansa.html) (accessed 13 June
2019), Bundeskartellamt, Fallbericht B9-175/17 – Lufthansa, 29 May 2018, 3 (https://www.bundeskartel
lamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/DE/Fallberichte/Missbrauchsaufsicht/2018/B9-175-17.pdf?__blob=
publicationFile&v=4) (accessed 13 June 2019), Interviewwith the president of the Bundeskartellamt Andreas
Mundt with in Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung (http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Interviews/
DE/2018/180127_NOZ.html) (accessed 13 June 2019), Andreas Mundt, Sixty Years and Still
Exciting – The Bundeskartellamt in the Digital Era, 6 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, 3 (2018); Lufthansa-
subsidiary Austrian Airlines might also be facing an inquiry involving pricing algorithms (https://kurier.at/
wirtschaft/ueberteuert-behoerde-hat-fluege-wien-bruessel-im-visier/400051874) (accessed 13 June 2019).
162 Cf. in detail Nicolo Zingales, Antitrust Intent in an Age of Algorithmic Nudging, Ch. 3.1, https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3266624 (accessed 13 June 2019).
163 Among the other prongs are Google Android (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_
details.cfm?proc_code=1_40099) and Google AdSense (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/
isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40411).
164 The EU Commission found Google dominant in general internet search markets in all thirty-one
countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) since 2008 (except in the Czech Republic since
2011) and abusing its dominance in all thirteen EEA countries in which it offered Google shopping.
165 Google Search (Shopping), Case AT.39740, decision of 27 June 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf.
166 Cf. Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm
(accessed 13 June 2019).
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questions, i.a. related to two-sided markets,167 on how to categorize Google’s
abusive conduct,168 and what an appropriate implementation of the EU
Commission’s remedies would look like.169
Evidence in the case included 5.2 terabytes of search result data from Google.
However, judging from the publicly available information, the EU Commission does
not seem to have had any special insight into the functioning of Google’s search
algorithms. In order to establish that Google’s algorithms, including one called ‘Panda’,
demoted competing shopping comparison services170 according to certain criteria,171 the
EU Commission relied on blogposts and documents,172 as well as the fact that the
visibility of competing comparison shopping serviceswas at the highest before the launch
of Panda and dropped afterwards with no sustainable recovery.173 The fact that Google
Shopping was not subject to the same ranking mechanism as its competing services was
apparently established based on emails, replies to the Commission’s request for informa-
tion, and other data.174
Furthermore, the Commission did not attempt to meddle in the design or
workings of Google’s search algorithm. The Commission stated, for instance,
that Google’s search algorithm would not be examined175 nor interfered with.176
167 Rupprecht Podszun, Der grosse Donner – hat sich Alphabet vergoogelt?, https://www.d-kart.de/der-grosse-
donner-hat-sich-alphabet-vergoogelt (accessed 13 June 2019).; on two- and multi-sided markets: Thomas
Hoppner, Defining Markets for Multi-Sided Platforms: The Case of Search Engines, 38 WC 349 (2015); Stefan
Holzweber, Market Definition for Multi-Sided Platforms: A Legal Reappraisal, 40 WC 536 (2017)
168 For example, discrimination (Anca Chirita, Google’s Anti-Competitive and Unfair Practices in Digital Leisure
Markets, 11 The Competition L. Rev. 109, 120, 122 (2015); Renato Nazzini, Google and the (Ever-
Stretching) Boundaries of Art. 102 TFUE [sic], 6 JECLAP 301, 307–10 (2015)), tying (pro: Chirita, ibid.,
at 121; Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?, 11 J.
Competition L. & Econ. 365, 369–78 (2015)), refusal to supply (contra: Chirita, ibid., at 123; Nazzini,
ibid., at 307–10), margin squeeze (contra: Nazzini, ibid., at 307–10) or lack of any abuse and theory (John
Lang, Comparing Microsoft and Google: The Concept of Exclusionary Abuse, 39 WC 5, 27–28 (2016); Torsten
Körber,Common Errors Regarding Search Engine Regulation – and How to Avoid Them, 36 ECLR 239 (2015)).
169 The EU Commission specified the remedies in its corrected Tender Specification of 17 July 2017 for
Technical Expertise in the case, 4–5, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=2629
(accessed 13 June 2019); see for case law on access remedies and Google’s implementation: Bo Vesterdorf &
Kyriakos Fountoukakos, An Appraisal of the Remedy in the Commission’s Google Search (Shopping) Decision and a
Guide to Its Interpretation in Light of anAnalytical Reading of theCase Law, 9 JECLAP3 (2018); calling this a ‘magic
stroke’ and favouring the EU Commission not to fumble with any algorithms: Rupprecht Podszun, The
Google Case: First Comments by Haucap, Kersting, Podszun, https://www.d-kart.de/the-google-case-first-
comments.
170 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 165, para. 349.
171 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 165, paras 352, 358.
172 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 165, para. 358.
173 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 165, para. 361.
174 Google Search (Shopping), supra n. 165, paras 380–83.
175 Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740, 3 Apr. 2013, Annex 4, s. A, para. 6, ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf. (accessed 13 June 2019).
176 EU Commission Statement on the Google Investigation, 5 Feb. 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-14-93_en.htm (accessed 13 June 2019).
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On the remedies side, the proposed remedy of equal treatment177 was not
supposed to interfere with the search algorithm178 or object to its fundamental
structure either.179 In this sense, the decision rather takes on a result-based
approach, holding Google liable for the outcome the algorithm produced.180
4 WHERE COMPETITION LAW MIGHT LEARN AND IMPROVE
There are many lessons and proposals for the development of competition law that
one might – and should – draw from the previous sections of this contribution. On
a fundamental level, competition law must be designed so as to protect the
dynamic, innovation-enhancing efficiency of algorithmic markets. Learning from
other areas of the law will help competition law to frame – by combining
transparency, prevention, deterrence, intervention, and systemic tools – algorithmic
market activity towards a beneficial, dynamically efficient state. As concrete steps
on this way, we want to highlight the following:
(1) So far, it has been possible to tackle cases involving algorithms largely with the
existing tools of competition law (enforcement), without delving too deep into
technical details.181 However, this is likely to change, especially if further economic
and empirical research confirms that algorithmic markets host a high potential for
collusion. This will force competition authorities to improve the factual and analy-
tical foundation on which they base their decisions and policies.182 This suggests not
only additional inquiries into sectors on which digitalization and ‘algorithmization’
have a strong impact.183 The above-sketched ‘transparency prong’ of MiFID II,184 for
177 Cf. on this duty Eduardo Aguilera Valdivia, The Scope of the ‘Special Responsibility’ upon Vertically
Integrated Dominant Firms After the Google Shopping Case: Is There a Duty to Treat Rivals Equally and
Refrain from Favouring Own Related Business?, 41 WC 43 (2018).
178 Commission MEMO/15/4781, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4781_en.htm
(accessed 13 June 2019).
179 Commission MEMO/17/1785, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1785_en.htm
(accessed 13 June 2019); Aguilera Valdivia, supra n. 177, at 66.
180 See in more detail Zingales, supra n. 162, at Ch. 3.1. Google’s appeal of the decision is pending (Case T-612/
17,ActionBrought on 11 Sept. 2017–Google andAlphabet v.CommissionOJC369, 30Oct. 2017, 37–38).
181 Cf. however the screening tool of the Swiss Competition Commission to detect price fixing in
procurement, David Imhof, Yavuz Karagök & Samuel Rutz, Screening for Bid Rigging – Does It
Work?, 14 J. of Competition L. & Econ. 235 (2018).
182 Rupprecht Podszun, The More Technological Approach: Competition Law in the Digital Economy, 101, 107
(Gintarė Surblytė, Competition on the Internet, Springer 2015); cf. also Monopolkommission, supra n.
124, para. 240; the German Bundeskartellamt and the French Autorité de la concurrence launched a
joint project on algorithms and their implications on competition aiming at analysing challenges
resulting from algorithms and trying to identify any approaches, https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/19_06_2018_Algorithmen.html?nn=3591568
(accessed 13 June 2019).
183 Cf. Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, paras 233–37, also evaluating the right of consumer protection
organizations to request sector inquiries by amending § 34a of the German Act against Restraints of
Competition (Competition Act – GWB).
184 Cf. supra s. 2.2.1.
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instance, shows that algorithm users’ duties to inform and document can contribute a
lot to keeping authorities (at least theoretically) up-to-date. Corroborating this
approach, the UK Digital Competition Expert Panel considered in its March 2019
report that businesses should understand and be able to explain their algorithms and
their interactivity with other firm’s algorithms as well as any measures undertaken
against potential biases and anti-competitiveness.185
When specific issues arise, authorities should be able and willing to carry out
testing exercises regarding algorithms or AI systems, be it alone or in cooperation
with the involved undertakings. As Article 7 RTS 6 and the respective experience of
Financial Conduct Authorities show, it can be helpful to design these tests in a
‘sandboxing’ style, i.e. in a protected model environment.186 Sandboxing may
become especially important, if algorithmic collusion turns out to be a frequent
reality.187 For such endeavours, competition authorities may need additional
resources (know-how, tools, skilled staff, etc.).188 In the aftermath of the Google
Shopping decision, for instance, the EU was looking for a technical expert189 to
monitor compliance with and implementation of the decision.190 The expert’s tasks
were rather challenging and included the assessment – depending also on Google’s
approach for remedy implementation – of how Google’s and its competitors’ com-
parison shopping services are positioned and displayed on the search results page, as
well as the standards, algorithms, mechanism and parameters used therefore.191
Some suggest, inter alia with regard to Swiss competition law,192 that firms may
submit their algorithms to the respective competition law authority for analysis and
clearance.193 A positive result of such an ‘ex ante audit’ could mitigate the risk of being
185 Digital Competition Expert Panel, Unlocking Digital Competition, Report of the Digital Competition Expert
Panel, Mar. 2019, para. 3.171, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-digital-com
petition-report-of-the-digital-competition-expert-panel (accessed 13 June 2019).
186 Cf. supra s. 2.2.2.
187 Cf. Calvano, Calzolari, Denicolò & Pastorello, supra n. 156, at 41.
188 In Switzerland, the Competition Commission has mentioned the possibility to employ technical
specialists (https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/das-anliegen-der-fair-preis-initiative-ist-berechtigt-ld.
1391008) and is at least building on its technical expertise (https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/wenn-
algorithmen-kartelle-bilden-ld.1415028); Margrethe Vestager publicly discussed employing algorithms
to detect collusion (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-antitrust-algorithm/eu-considers-using-
algorithms-to-detect-anti-competitive-acts-idUSKBN1I5198); Michal Gal is suggesting that competi-
tion authorities build on technical expertise, also considering that possible remedies may include orders
to stop using the algorithm, to not disclose the algorithm to competitors or to amend the algorithm
(Competition Lore Podcast by Caron Beaton-Wells, supra n. 119, at 58”04’, https://overcast.fm/
+N2zZD5F3Q/58:04); Schwalbe, supra n. 144, at 22; cf also infra n. 193.
189 https://ted.europa.eu/TED/notice/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:244258-2017:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1.
190 Tender Specifications, Corrected Version of 17 July 2017, 3, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-
document.html?docId=27867.
191 Ibid., at 5-6.
192 Picht & Freund, supra n. 111, at 408.
193 The FTC, for instance, established the Office of Technology Research and Investigation (https://
www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/office-technology-research-
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sanctioned for unwanted effects the respective algorithms generate when used in a
real-world environment. This option may be particularly attractive regarding under-
takings which have already violated competition law and subsequently altered their
algorithmic conduct in order to (purportedly) terminate the violation. Such preventive
monitoring should, however, not gravitate towards a highly impracticable and anti-
innovative scenario in which new algorithms or AI systems (legally or factually) require
ex ante authorization to be put on the market.194
(2) Privacy by design and by default (Article 25 GDPR) was advocated by EU
Commissioner Vestager as a standard of conduct under competition law as well,
stating that ‘[w]hat businesses can – and must – do is to ensure antitrust compliance
by design. That means pricing algorithms need to be built in a way that doesn’t
allow them to collude. Like a more honourable version of the computer HAL in
the film 2001, they need to respond to an offer of collusion by saying “I’m sorry,
I’m afraid I can’t do that.”’195 This would mean that undertakings should structure
their digital tools in a way that promises these tools to operate in a procompetitive
manner (pro-competitiveness by design). Furthermore, the procompetitive
configuration of a tool should form the pre-installed standard configuration
(pro-competitiveness by default).196
One might reject this policy element due to the different regulatory purposes of
privacy law and competition law. Another difference lies in the fact that the concept
of a ‘ban with permit reservation’, i.e. the general unlawfulness of data-relevant
measures unless they are justified by statutory reason or permission, is a principle
from EU data protection regulation and alien to competition law.197 However, the
stronger reasons weigh in favour of a pro-competitiveness by design and by default
approach. Given that not only data protection but also financial markets rules revert to
systemic, design and default approaches, competition law should consider doing the
same. Algorithmic markets are a rapidly evolving reality. Approaches that try to
investigation) (accessed 13 June 2019) that will also play an important role in helping the FTC
understand how algorithms and AI software work in particular markets (remarks of former FTC
Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, Algorithms and Coordinated Effects, 22 May 2017, 6, https://www.
ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1220673/mcsweeny_-_oxford_cclp_remarks_-_
algorithms_and_coordinated_effects_5-22-17.pdf); similarly, to deal with algorithms, AI and big data,
the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority is building a technology team (https://www.ft.com/
content/349103ba-c631-11e7-b2bb-322b2cb39656; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-
appoints-stefan-hunt-to-top-digital-role); cf. also supra n. 188.
194 For example, Google made 3’234 improvements to its search algorithm in 2018 (https://moz.com/
blog/how-often-does-google-update-its-algorithm).
195 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/bundeskartel
lamt-18th-conference-competition-berlin-16-march-2017_en.
196 Privacy by default (Art. 25 para. 2 GDPR) requires companies to process personal data with the
highest privacy protection in a way that by default personal data is not accessible to an indefinite
number of persons.
197 Sebastian Louven, Antitrust by Design – Kartellrechtliche Technik-Compliance für Algorithmen, Blockchain
und Plattformen?, InTeR 180–81 (2018).
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safeguard their pro-competitiveness ex ante, based on technology design, promise to
be more effective than ex post enforcement via fines and conduct commitments.
More than that, antitrust compliance by design and by default seems more apt to
mitigate the risk that competition law violations escape notice altogether because they
are committed by undertakings technologically superior to enforcement authorities.198
On a conceptual level, this reflects the fact that privacy by design and default can be
characterized as a principles-based regulation (as opposed to rules-based regulation),199
a type of regulation typically more capable to cope with a fast-developing technical
and economic environment.200 Finally, giving pro-competitive rules of action to
digital agents is, in a way, not so different from establishing a competition law-
compliant code of conduct for human employees, and the latter is a well-known
element of competition law compliance.201
The real intricacy is, of course, to identify what the design and the default
should be in complex scenarios.202 Some authors suggest that, regarding simple
pricing algorithms, this may mean that the algorithms ought to be set not to react
to price changes when they result from certain companies203 or not to follow and
match price increases by competitors but only their price decreases.204 Others, like
the German Monopolies Commission, point to the risk that very rigid regulatory
198 Cf. also Simonetta Vezzoso, Competition by Design, Ch. 3, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986440
(accessed 13 June 2019).
199 Tilen Čuk & Arnaud van Waeyenberge, European Legal Framework for Algorithmic and High Frequency Trading
(Mifid 2 and MAR) – A Global Approach to Managing the Risks of the Modern Trading Paradigm, 9 EJRR 146,
152 (2018). Principles-based regulation focusses on the outcomes and requires firms to take responsibility in
conceiving measures realizing these outcomes, whereas rules-based regulation specifies rules of conduct,
obliges firms to adhere to these rules and attempts to thereby realize the desired outcomes (Pascal Frantz &
Norvald Instefjord, Regulatory Competition and Rules/Principles-Based Regulation, 45 JBFA 818, 819 (2018)).
Although this dichotomy has been prominently discussed mainly in financial markets regulation, it seems
noteworthy that both data protection and financial markets law employ a combination of rules and
principles for framing algorithmic market activity. This suggests that it could be wise for other areas of
the law – including competition law – to pursue a similar approach, setting rules where the dos and don’ts
seem reasonably clear while reverting to principles-based provisions in case of uncertainty over what
detailed rules should look like. An adapted principle of competition law compliance by default and design,
for instance, could induce market players to shape their algorithmic market activity in a way that restricts
the unwanted, uncontrolled exchange of sensitive market data between competitors.
200 Winston J. Maxwell, Principles-Based Regulation of Personal Data: The Case of ‘Fair Processing’, 5 IDPL
205, 212, 214 (2015).
201 Cf., for instance, British Sugar, Com OJ. 1999 L 76/1, para. 208.
202 See also Vezzoso, supra n. 198, at Ch. 4.
203 Antonio Gomes, Disruptive Innovation, Big Data and Algorithms, OECD Presentation of 31 Aug. 2017,
40, http://www.sic.gov.co/sites/default/files/documentos/092017/antonio-ferreira-gomes-disrup
tive-innovation-big-data-and-algorithms.pptx (accessed 13 June 2019); Vezzoso, supra n. 198, at Ch.
4, also considering excluding collecting certain categories of data altogether.
204 The CMA identified this as a topic for further research while also pointing out that the underlying
rationale of maximizing firm profit might make this ‘too interventionist and damage the competitive
process to restrict firms’ ability to set its own prices’ (Competition and Markets Authority, supra n.
147, para. 9.1(b)); see also Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Two Artificial Neural Networks Meet in an
Online Hub and Change the Future (Of Competition, Market Dynamics and Society), University of
Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper 1, 43 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2949434 (accessed
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stipulations may block legitimate algorithmic pricing strategies and create barriers
to market entry by raising regulatory cost.205 The OECD also highlights the
threat for innovation and underlines that such rules place considerable supervising
burdens on the agencies in charge.206
The design of regulatory stipulations for pricing algorithms will be particularly
challenging with regard to deep learning algorithms.207 While scrutinizing the
code of an algorithm (static testing) might be an option for simple algorithmic
scenarios, it will fail for deep learning due to its inherent complexity.208 In such
cases, a viable option might be dynamic testing, whereby the deep learning
system’s output is compared with the input previously received.209 Sometimes,
such testing will tell that a particular input has a tendency to produce non-
compliant output and that it should not, therefore, form the input training basis,
even though the (growing) complexity of deep learning and its inherent mutability
tend to complicate predicting correlations between input and output.210
Moreover, it will not be possible to properly assess the risk of algorithmic collusion
based on the features of individual algorithms, without also looking at their
interactions with each other.211 Here, economic theory or sandboxing exercises212
could be capable of singling out design/default-worthy configurations.
The setting of standards for compliant, beneficial algorithm design by
stakeholder-based organizations, potentially including certification to demon-
strate compliance by design and default (cf. Article 25 paragraph 3 GDPR),
could be a promising mechanism, as the success of standards for digital com-
munication shows. Data protection and financial markets law have, so far, not
pushed it very strongly.213 Competition law, however, has already gained
considerable experience on how to establish a workable, pro-competitive
legal framework for standard-setting organizations, i.a. by securing open access
to these organizations for all relevant stakeholders.214 It can therefore, possibly,
13 June 2019), exploring the option of allowing immediate price decreases, while implementing a time
lag for price increases.
205 Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 251; see also Gomes, supra n. 203, at 40.
206 OECD, supra n. 2, at 50.
207 See also Vezzoso, supra n. 198, Ch. 4.
208 Joseph E. Harrington, Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Artificial Agents, 14 J.
Competition L. & Econ. 331, 354–55 (2019).
209 Ibid., at 355.
210 Ibid., at 355-56.
211 Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio Pastorello, Algorithmic Pricing What
Implications for Competition Policy?, 55 Review of Industrial Organization 156, 165 (2019).
212 Cf. supra s. 2.2.2; proposing an ‘algorithmic collusion incubator’: Ezrachi & Stucke, supra n. 204, at 42-43.
213 Cf., however, the discussion on standard-setting for the technologies underlying data portability according
to Art. 20 GDPR, Inge Graef, Jeroen Verschakelen & Peggy Valcke, Putting the Right to Data Portability into
a Competition Law Perspective 5, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2416537 (accessed 13 June 2019).
214 See for instance on the framework setting for the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) by the European Commission: Christian Koenig & Ana Trias, Some Standards for
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take a lead in the joint attempt of several legal regimes215 to establish an
appropriate standard-setting regime for algorithmic market activity. Where
previous experience, clear results from testing or theory, convincing standards
or similar guidance is not at hand, though, competition law enforcement must
be careful not to place excessive liability burdens on the market players216 by
considering every undesirable market outcome as the result of a design/default
violation.
(3) A conceptual alternative to the aforementioned antitrust compliance by
design and by default could be a, less intrusive,217 ‘results-based approach’218
which entitles authorities to intervene where they detect anticompetitive market
outcomes, even if they do not (immediately) manage to prove flaws in algorithmic
design or the presence of subjective elements, such as knowledge or intention.219
This seems to be the tendency in the Google Shopping decision and the system of
ex post intervention measures in MiFID II shows that such an approach can be
viable longterm, even with regard to markets as complex and fast-moving as
financial markets.220
The results of complex, even self-learning algorithms and their interactions
with other (algorithmic) market forces can be very hard for undertakings to
predict and control.221 One result from the Google Shopping decision might be
that companies with algorithmic intermediary services will, therefore, conduct
monitoring in order to proof their ‘compliance by design’222 or at least their
appropriate care to avoid anti-competitive algorithmic results. It remains to be
seen whether such exercises effectively shield from liability.223 If the Google
Shopping decision were taken (even pending appeal224) to establish a rigorous
Standardisation: A Basis for Harmonisation and Efficiency Maxmisation of EU and US Antitrust Control of the
Standard-Setting Process, 32 EIPR 320, 325 (2010); Michael Fröhlich, Standards und Patente – Die ETSI
IPR Policy, GRUR 205 (2008).
215 This would involve not only competition, data protection and financial markets law, but also other
legal regimes, for instance on product liability, ethical considerations or contracts.
216 Nicolo Zingales, Google Shopping: Beware of ‘Self-Favouring’ in a World of Algorithmic Nudging, https://
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/google-shopping-beware-of-self-favouring-in-a-world-of-
algorithmic-nudging (accessed 13 June 2019).
217 Calvano, Calzolari, Denicolò & Pastorello, supra n. 211, at 15.
218 See also Gal, supra n. 154, at 117.
219 Picht & Freund, supra n. 111, at 408; this approach also has the advantage of clearly distributing
liability among the involved players, in a digital world consisting of developer, implementers and users
of algorithms/AI systems. Incentivizing parties to clearly document who decided on the specifications
for a system may be worthwhile as well, for instance by granting developers a ‘client’s choice defence’
if a (anticompetitive) setting was requested by the implementer.
220 Cf. supra s. 2; see further Čuk & van Waeyenberge, supra n. 199, at 152.
221 Monopolkommission, supra n. 124, para. 170; Picht & Freund, supra n. 111, at 408.
222 Zingales, supra n. 162, Ch. 3.1.
223 Ibid.
224 Case T-612/17, Action Brought on 11 Sept. 2017 – Google and Alphabet v. Commission OJ C 369,
30 Oct. 2017, at 37–38.
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results-based approach, this may generate excessively strict liability absent limit-
ing concepts.225 These could include a predictability defence, a ‘notice and re-
adjustment’ mechanism, potentially including an obligation to establish ‘kill
switches’226 as an emergency tool against anticompetitive algorithmic dynamics,
or even possibly an exculpatory defence where an algorithm was designed
according to compliance by default and design.227
(4) Undoubtedly, algorithms provide demand-side efficiencies by helping con-
sumers to judge prices, quality and variety, for example by means of price compar-
ison websites or rating portals. They can thus reduce search transaction costs or help
avoid biases.228 However, consumers can have great difficulties to detect algorithmic
practices patronizing or harming them and to defend their interests against such
practices. To take a seemingly mild, but potentially far-reaching example, Amazon’s
recently patented ‘anticipatory shipping’ might predict what customers want and
deliver it to them before an order is even placed.229 The introduction of such
‘algorithmic consumers’230 could well come at the price of reduced consumer
autonomy.231 Balancing such risks may require specific customer information
rights and company transparency duties similar to those stipulated by the
GDPR.232
A core element of such duties could be the obligation to thoroughly explain
the workings of an algorithm, not on a technical level but regarding its impact on
the customer, especially where it is designed to replace customer choice.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that companies employing algorithms should
display a notice including the requirements of competition law and how the firm
deals with them.233 A duty to disclose source code, on the contrary, may impair
legitimate confidentiality interests and innovation incentives too strongly, while
being of limited help to those affected by the source code’s workings.234 A further
225 Zingales, supra n. 162, Ch. 4. This issue will be much aggravated as growing sophistication increasingly
turns algorithms into ‘black boxes’ not only for competition law enforcers but also for the market
players using them.
226 On the use of ‘kill functionalities’ in financial markets regulation, supra s. 2.2.3; on the danger of
learning algorithms overcoming such a kill-switch, see Laurent Orseau & Stuart Armstrong, Safely
Interruptible Agents, http://intelligence.org/files/Interruptibility.pdf (accessed 13 June 2019).
227 See also Zingales, supra n. 216.
228 OECD, supra n. 2, at 17, 18.
229 Praveen Kopalle, Why Amazon’s Anticipatory Shipping Is Pure Genius, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
onmarketing/2014/01/28/why-amazons-anticipatory-shipping-is-pure-genius/#3928d2ed4605
(accessed 13 June 2019).
230 Gal and Elkin-Koren coined this term for algorithms bypassing genuine consumer choice, see Michal
S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 309, 310 (2017).
231 Ibid., at 322–23.
232 Art. 13 para. 2 lit. f, Art. 14 para. 2 lit. g and Art. 15 para. 1 lit. h GDPR.
233 Vezzoso, supra n. 198, at Ch. 4.
234 This is not only true for non-technological users, but also for more tech-savvy users: after reddit
disclosed its ranking code, programmers and developers were disagreeing on its functioning (https://
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line must be drawn where transparency would substantially facilitate (tacit)
collusion.235
All in all, a duty to disclose whether an algorithm was involved in the
decision-making process and to explain its logic in basic terms, i.e. an obligation
similar to the requirements made by Article 22 GDPR, could increase companies’
incentives to design their algorithmic tools in a way that is both legally compliant
and attractive from the viewpoint of consumers’ interests. Not only law enforce-
ment but also market dynamics could thus generate a push towards a beneficial
design of algorithms.
www.businessinsider.com/two-programmers-claim-reddits-voting-algorithm-is-flawed-2013-12?r=
US&IR=T); in deep learning applications, even its developers and engineers are often unaware of the
specific decision-making processes (https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-
at-the-heart-of-ai) (accessed 13 June 2019).
235 Cf. in detail Gal, supra n. 154, at 84-88.
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